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respected by law courts, although not widely adopted
by practicing physicians. Guidelines are usually
grounded in evidence-based arguments, numerical
proofs of futility, and lack of cost effectiveness; these
are helpful but insufficient2 bases for resolving the eth-
ical quandary we face when an 83-year-old patient
arrives in the emergency room with tearing chest pain
and a widened mediastinum. When the patient is a
“good, and very fit 83 year old,” surgeons respond as
warriors, rallying to the challenge of our mortal enemy.
Desperate family members plead for intervention
despite heavy odds. Elderly patients, although more
reconciled to human finality than their younger res-
cuers, often entrust decision making to their doctors and
their families. Although some elderly patients want
every feasible lifesaving measure, educating them about
poor outcomes reduces demand for treatments like car-
diopulmonary resuscitation.3
Guidelines are generally drawn up by physicians and
adopted by physician groups without public participa-
tion. British doctors established guidelines that exclud-
ed older patients from dialysis; they were vilified when
their decision came to public notice.4 In contrast, poli-
cies (as their Latin root, polites—the citizens, implies)
often derive from a broader public process. Public par-
ticipation is especially appropriate for making decisions
to limit the care of citizens who are ill. The United
Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) uses public con-
sultation to ensure the acceptance of its resource alloca-
tion decisions. Proposed policies affecting the distribu-
tion of organs are sent out “for public comment” to a
broad spectrum of citizens, including politicians,
patient advocacy groups, and media commentators, to
assure transparency and public defensibility of the deci-
sion-making process. 
Once accepted, publicly reviewed policies are
extremely helpful in the procedural aspects of justice.
In principle, age alone, like sex, race, religion, level of
intelligence, and other personal characteristics, is not
accepted as a morally relevant criterion for just alloca-
tion of health care resources.5 Benefit and need are the
only criteria that should be used to guide these deci-
sions. Appropriately, Neri and his colleagues anchor the
logic of their proposal in the lack of benefit from their
intervention. Although age alone is not an acceptable
I n this issue of the Journal, Neri and his colleaguesprovide empirical evidence to support sparing octoge-
narians, their families, and their caregivers from the
tragic experience the authors encountered with opera-
tive treatment of type A dissections of the thoracic
aorta. Of 24 consecutive surgically treated patients in
this age group, 8 died intraoperatively, 12 more died
without leaving the hospital, and none of the 4 who
were discharged lived beyond 6 months. No survivor
returned to “a normal, functioning, integrated” life, the
criterion used by the Massachusetts courts to justify a
physician’s decision to withhold resuscitative mea-
sures.1 Their report is courageous, because poor out-
comes are rarely published; authors and journals usual-
ly compete instead to proclaim favorable results of
cardiac surgery in older patients. The Sienna group rec-
ommends a professional guideline that excludes octo-
genarians from surgical treatment of type A aortic
aneurysms. In this commentary, I will argue that creat-
ing a local institutional policy, with public as well as
professional participation, is a more prudent approach.
When patients, families, and surgeons are required to
make decisions about the initiation or withdrawal of
heroic life-sustaining treatments, a clear and reasonable
institutional policy can be helpful to all. Judicious poli-
cies are now widely used to enable the harvest of organs
for transplantation and for protection of the irretriev-
ably ill from intubation and resuscitation by cardiac
arrest teams.
Guidelines, as suggested by Neri and associates, can
be helpful in establishing the standard of care. They are
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should include a conversation with informed members
of the public, such as former cardiac surgery and inten-
sive care patients, their relatives, and other interested
and capable citizens. Public conversation about the
acceptance of death, the quality of end-of-life care, and
legitimate priority setting will enable them to follow
Paris’s proscription of heroic treatments that compli-
cate the dying process without preserving purposeful
life. I believe that informed octogenarian patients, their
families, and their caregivers will welcome a policy on
type A thoracic aortic aneurysms that limits the goals
of treatment to comfort and dignity. 
I am grateful to John Paris and Peter A. Singer for helpful
comments on an earlier version of this commentary.
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criterion for exclusion, it may serve, as argued by
Neri’s group, as a tightly linked proxy for the ability to
benefit from surgical treatment. An institutional policy
based on this linkage would stand up to public scrutiny
so long as options are offered for exceptional cases to
be treated despite the general policy, or to be referred
elsewhere. Thoughtful further discussion of the issue of
age-based rationing can be found in Beauchamp and
Childress’s influential textbook of bioethics.6
John Paris taught us at the University of Chicago’s
MacLean Center for Clinical Medical Ethics how effec-
tive “We don’t do that here” can be as an approach to
resolving conflicts when desperate families demand
heroic and inappropriate treatments against the advice
of caregivers.7 The authoritative power of this maxim
can be strengthened when it is incorporated into a pol-
icy by the specification of “we” to include the commu-
nity rather than just the physicians, the specification of
“that” to a particular treatment or its application in a
particular patient group, and the specification of “here”
to recognize that the policy is particular to one institu-
tion. Policies are restricted to the place and time they
are adopted; they may be amended in light of new
information or new capabilities. Some become widely
adopted, such as the “do not resuscitate” policy of the
University of Chicago Hospitals and the policy on dis-
continuation of life support after brain death as defined
at the Massachusetts General Hospital. Such policies
are based in part on data from the medical literature and
on the experience and values of the institution, rather
than “the personal predilections of the practitioner.”8
Hospital policies that govern the allocation of health
care resources should be just, equitable, transparent,
publicly defensible, implemented by a legitimate
authority, and subject to appeal in appropriate circum-
stances.9
Rather than attempting to convince professional
organizations to adopt treatment guidelines, Neri and
his colleagues in the Unita Toracica can help their hos-
pital develop a policy based on their data. The process
